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1. Abstract 
 
Both the WTO and the EC have come to a crossroads in their 
development. The WTO is currently the subject of the Doha round of 
negotiations, while the EC, together with pillars II and III of the EU, is 
about to be re-constituted under the draft European Constitution. The 
issue of the articulation between these two legal systems, despite the best 
efforts of legal academics over the years, remains unresolved, as 
evidenced in the recent case of Biret International SA v. Council.1 Issues 
which were resolved in the early years of the EC on the nexus of the 
relationship between the EC and the laws of its member states, are now 
reappearing at the EC-WTO nexus. The EC-Member State principles of 
supremacy,2 direct effect3 and state liability for the non-implementation 
                                                 
∗
 Law Division, Dundee Business School, University of Abertay Dundee, Bell Street, Dundee DD 1 
1HG, Scotland, Tel: 01382 308421, Fax: 01382 308400, E-mail: m.oneill@abertay.ac.uk 
1
 Cases C-93/02, and Case –94/02, Biret International SA v. Council of the European Union, ECR 
2003 
2
 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 405, [1966] CMLR 111. et al. 
3
 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, [1963] 
CMLR 105, Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1405, [1975] 1 CMLR 1 et al. 
 2 
of directives4 are now being echoed at the WTO-EC nexus, in the context 
of direct effect,5 legality control, and indirect effect. The Biret case raised 
the issue of “no-fault liability for the Community” for non-compliance 
with WTO law, echoing discourses many years earlier at the EC-MS 
nexus. The issue of the boundary demarcations between EC Commercial 
law and WTO law merits re-examination in light of these developments, 
with the continuing imperfect legal articulation between these two 
jurisdictions resulting in a boundary clash which requires a resolution. 
Ideally this resolution would come in the form of a treaty amendment 
drafted by the member states of the EU. In this respect the draft 
Constitution, which fails to adequately address this issue could be seen as 
a missed opportunity. The ECJ may well find itself obliged to develop on 
the Advocate General’s opinion in the Biret case. 
 
2. Introduction 
 
Biret International SA v. Council,6 raised the possibility of the 
development of “no-fault liability for the Community in respect of its 
normative acts” where there had been a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
ruling on the non-compliance of EC law with WTO law. The CFI rejected 
this possibility finding that ‘the purpose of the WTO agreements is to 
govern relations between States …. for economic integration… and not to 
protect individuals’.7 The CFI reaffirmed the findings in Portugal v. 
Council,8 following the Fedoil9 and Nakajima10 hypothesis, and found 
that the facts of the Biret case did not fall within the two exceptions to the 
rule that WTO law did not have direct effect in EC law. It further found 
that the ruling of the DSB did not alter the EC’s law in this area, finding 
that a ruling of the DSB would only become relevant if the Court had 
                                                 
4
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found that the agreement in question, in this instance the SPS agreement, 
had direct effect, which was not the finding of the CFI in this case. The 
case was appealed to the ECJ, with the opinion of Advocate General 
Alber providing a new perspective on this issue. 
 
Building on Germany v. Council,11 the ECJ in Portugal12 found 
that ‘in conformity with the principles of public international law’, the EC 
was free to conclude an agreement with a non-EC member state, which 
could be made to have effect within the ‘internal legal order of the 
contracting parties’.13 Further, it held that it was only in the absence of 
such an express agreement that the ECJ would have to determine what 
legal effect, if any, such an agreement would have within the EC legal 
jurisdiction.14 Under international law, it was recognised by the ECJ that 
there was an obligation for the ‘bona fide performance of every 
agreement’; however, this in itself did not determine what legal effect that 
international agreement would have within the domestic jurisdiction of 
the contracting parties.15 This approach was echoed at the WTO level by 
the panel in United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974.16 
This panel, ruling on US law, and referring to the doctrine of direct effect, 
stated that; ‘Neither the GATT nor the WTO has so far been interpreted 
by GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing direct effect”. 
Following this approach, the GATT/WTO did not create a new legal 
order, the subjects of which comprise both contracting parties or 
members and their nationals.17 However, as pointed out by Zonnekeyn, 
the panel report does have an interesting aside in a footnote18 that the 
issue of whether WTO agreements would ‘create rights for individuals’, 
which national courts would have to protect, ‘remains an open question, 
in particular in respect of obligations following the exhaustion of DSU 
procedures in a specific dispute’.19 In addition, the panel reserved the 
right to the WTO to ‘construe any obligations as having direct effect’, 
and that, in the absence of such construction, member states of the WTO 
were not precluded from ‘following internal constitutional principles’, 
finding that some obligations ‘give rights to individuals’.20 
 
                                                 
11
 Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I- 4973 
12
 Op. Cit. footnote no. 5. 
13
 Ibid., at paragraph 34 of the judgment. 
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 United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, report of the panel released on 22 
December 1999, WT/DS152/R, at para. 7.72 
17
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of World Trade 34(3): 111-125, 2000 
18
 footnote no. 661. 
19
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20
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The above findings formed the legal backdrop to the opinion of 
Advocate General Alber in the Biret case. The intervening years between 
Portugal and Biret had, however, seen the development of an intense 
academic discourse in this area, and saw a number of further cases 
appearing before the CFI and ECJ. Of particular interest to this author is 
Van Houtte’s highlighting of the “political aspect” of the ECJ’s decision 
in the Portugal case, given that the ECJ took into consideration issues 
outside the confines of its own legal system, such as the fact that the EC’s 
contracting parties at the WTO concluded that WTO rules did not have 
direct effect within their own legal systems.21 Reliance was made on the 
‘reciprocal character of the WTO Agreements’ with the WTO being seen 
as a ‘forum for negotiations’, which some commentators referred to as 
being ‘anachronistic’.22 However, other commentators took it as being 
fair comment with Ehlermann warning against unduly tying the ‘hands of 
the Community negotiators’.23 The WTO bodies’ lack of democratic 
accountability has been highlighted by Rosas, who pointed out that 
‘granting direct effect to WTO rules would play into the hands of the 
likes of anti-globalisation protestors’, and ‘could instead deprive the 
democratic institutions of the EU and other WTO members of the margin 
of manoeuvre they currently possess so as to strike a balance between 
trade and societal values’.24  
 
3. Grappling with the problem 
 
 The academic discourse had developed the concepts of the non-
reciprocity of direct effect,25 legality control26 and indirect effect.27 The 
legality control argument in particular gave rise to a politically pragmatic 
response from the ECJ in the Portugal case, when it implied ‘that legal 
control of acts’ of EC institutions pursuant to WTO law would be 
‘impossible because the ECJ must leave the necessary “freedom” to the 
EC legislator in order not to endanger the EC’s future negotiating 
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 Hans van Houtte; The Law of International Trade, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995 
22
 Op. Cit. footnote no.17. 
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Allan Rosas; Case Note; Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, Judgment of the full Court of 23 
November 1999, Common Market Law Review 37: 797-816, 2000 
25
 initially raised by AG Tesauro in the Hermès case (Case C-53/96 (reference for a preliminary ruling 
from the Arrondissementsrechtbank de Amsterdam): Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice 
BV, Official Journal C 258, 15/08/1998 p. 9), and commented on by Geert A. Zonnekeyn in “The 
Status of WTO Law in the EC Legal Order; The Final Curtain?” Journal of World Trade 34(3): 111-
125, 2000, and Axel Desmedt; European Court of Justice on the Effect of the “WTO Agreements in the 
EC Legal Order”, LIEI, 200 27(1), 93-101. 
26
 Axel Desmedt; European Court of Justice on the Effect of the “WTO Agreements in the EC Legal 
Order”, LIEI, 200 27(1), 93-101 
27
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position towards its trading partners in the WTO’.28 Zonnekeyn sees this 
as not being a legal argument but rather a political one, being ‘an obvious 
assault to the “trias political” principle, which ought to be the cornerstone 
of every legal system’.29 The view therefore being adopted was that the 
‘absence of direct effect of an international agreement protected the 
validity of Community acts’.30 These above attempts to rationalise the 
legal relationship between the EC and the WTO have been reflected in 
the jurisprudence of fellow members of the WTO, most notably in the US 
and Japan, with interesting observations to be made on the Italian case 
law, before it came under the influence of the ECJ’s line on this matter.  
 
4. Trends in International Case law 
 
The trends of the case law of the US and Japan match, to a certain 
extent, the development of the approach of the ECJ to the EC’s 
relationship with the WTO for the same period. It would appear that there 
was a movement from initially viewing GATT 47 as having, or having 
the potential to have, direct effect.  As GATT and the WTO laws become 
more complex and profound, there has been a retreat from this initial 
position with the development of a conclusion that perhaps the WTO 
legal regime may not have direct effect after all in domestic jurisdictions.  
 
4.1 US 
 
 
At the GATT panel level, the issue of the direct effect of GATT 47 
provisions arose in the panel report of United States: Alcoholic and malt 
beverages,31 which held that the then-version of ‘Article XXIV:1232 was 
not applicable to the United States’ as the panel noted, at 5.79 of its 
ruling, that these provisions were “designed to apply only to those 
measures by regional or local governments or authorities which the 
central government cannot control”. They were convinced, on the basis of 
the writing of Jackson and Hudec, that ‘GATT law had become part of 
US federal law, and since federal law, according to the US Constitution, 
is supreme over state law, any inconsistent state law had to give way 
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before GATT.33 This issue was addressed in the Uruguay Round 
‘Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994’, which is now complemented by 
Article 22(9) of the DSU.34 The article addresses the issue of federal 
states being responsible for the actions of its constituent states, which, in 
the absence of control being enforced by the federal government on the 
sub-national government, imposes ‘compensation and suspension of 
concessions’ provisions on the federal state.35 To the astonishment of 
Kuijper,36 the US had managed, through its implementing legislation and 
its accompanying statement of administrative action, to reduce ‘itself to 
the same situation as the EC’ by expressly ‘limiting the supremacy of 
federal law over state law’, and thereby to largely ‘undo the consequences 
of’ the adopted panel report in United States: Alcoholic and malt 
beverages.37 The current situation is that the US federal government can 
only force a state government to comply with WTO provisions by way of 
the federal government taking a court action ‘comparable to action 
pursuant to Article 169 of the EC Treaty’ (now Article 226 EC) against 
the state concerned.38 It should be noted that the WTO agreements now 
contain ‘an elaborate mechanism for consultation with state authorities 
with a view to guaranteeing that state law is in conformity with the WTO 
Agreement and its Annexes’.39 
 
4.2 Japan 
 
 
In Japan, Iwasawa40 referred to two domestic Japanese cases, which 
addressed the issue of the direct applicability of GATT in Japan, namely 
the Kolbe Jewellery case41 and the later Kyoto Neckties case.42 Under 
                                                 
33
 Pieter Jan Kuijper; The New WTO Dispute Settlement System; the Impact on the European 
Community, J.W.T. 1995, 29(6), 49-71. 
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 It provides that ‘The dispute settlement provisions of the coved agreements may be invoked in 
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 Op. Cit. footnote no. 33.  
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 Ibid.  
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 Yuji Iwasawa; Implementation if International Trade Agreements in Japan, in  Meinhard Hilf and 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), National Constitutions and International Economic Law, Kluwer 1993, 
ISBN 90 6544 665 6 
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519, 524 - 25. 
 7 
Japanese law, ‘treaties are accorded a high authority’, overriding statutes, 
even those subsequently enacted, under Article 98(2) of the Japanese 
Constitution. Following this approach, the courts in the Kolbe Jewellery 
case suggested that GATT 47 had direct effect within Japan. The later 
Kyoto Neckties case caused uproar in Japanese legal academic circles 
when the Kyoto District court’s judgement, ‘apparently denying the direct 
applicability of the GATT’, was endorsed by the Japanese Supreme Court 
in 1990.  This was a ‘poorly reasoned case’ according to Iwasawa and 
another academic, Professor Matsushita, who claimed that the courts in 
Kyoto Neckties seemed ‘to ignore Article 98(2) of the constitution’.43  
This was a strange claim to lay at the feet of any Supreme Court, leading 
to the possible conclusion that the decision was taken for unexpressed 
politically pragmatic reasons, along the lines taken by the ECJ in the later 
(1999) Portuguese Textiles case. 44 
 
4.3 Italy 
 
 
An interesting line of GATT jurisprudence can be seen within the 
EC on the issue of the direct effect of GATT 47 within the Italian 
jurisdiction. During the latter part of the 1960s, the Italian lower and 
appeals court had ruled that ‘Article III, para. 2 of GATT45 conferred on 
private parties a right to invoke it before the courts’, leading to the Italian 
state being ordered to reimburse GATT illegal taxes levied on importers. 
While the ECJ held that the EC had been substituted for the Member 
States with regard to commitments under the GATT from 1 July 1968 
with the introduction of the Common Customs Tariff,46 the Italian Corte 
di Cassazione was upholding, in 1968, the findings of its lower courts 
with regard to Article III, para. 2 of GATT.47 Since that finding, however, 
the impact of the ruling had ‘progressively lost significance in practice’,48 
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charges of any king in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. 
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to 
imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.’  
46
 Anmenistrazione delle Finanze dello State v. Societa Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA 
Michelen Italiana (SAMI)  (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione). 
Joined Cases 267 - 269/81. [1982] ECR 801. 
47
 Judgment No. 2293, 6 July 1968, Ministero delle Finanze v. Cotonificio Valle Ticino s.p.a., Foro 
Italiano 1968, I. 2462; Giust . Civ. 1968, 1, 1571; Riv. dir. int, 1969, 328; Dir. Scambi int. 1968, 504. 
48
 Carlo Mastellone; Case Report on Case 266/81, SIOT (Società Italiana per l‘Oleodotto Transalpino) 
s.p.a. v. Ministero delle Finanze, Ministero della Marina Mercantile, Circoscrizione doganale di 
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with the Italian courts beginning to reverse its position on GATT 47 in 
subsequent cases. During the 1970’s, while the ECJ was holding that in 
International Fruit49 that GATT 1947 was binding on the Community, 
the Italian courts were ‘developing the concept’ that GATT 47 had direct 
effect, and that ‘specific provisions may be considered as self-executing’ 
in light of their particular content, independent of other provisions of the 
agreement and regardless of ‘elements such as the absence of a 
jurisdiction for the settlement of disputes’.50 The Italian courts were 
aware that the ECJ had taken a different line on this issue, with the Corte 
di Cassazione stating that, in comparison to the ECJ line, its view was 
wider than that of the ECJ.  It also recognised that different member 
states of the EC might take different positions on the legal effect of 
GATT 47, holding that ‘GATT could not be considered a Community act 
under (the then) Article 177’.51 However, by the time of the SIOT and 
SAMI references to the ECJ in 1983 by the Corte di Cassazione, the 
Italian judiciary were happy to follow the ECJ’s line on the legal status of 
the GATT 47, thereby reversing their earlier case law on the matter.  
 
5. More Recent Cases 
 
 
 As stated earlier, a number of cases were heard by the ECJ and the 
CFI between Portugal v. Council and the Biret case, during which the 
issue of the legal relationship between the EC and the WTO arose. These 
cases, for the most part, which mainly dealt with bananas, are Atlanta,52 
and what have become known as the ‘March 2001’ judgments, of 
Cordis,53 Bocchi Food54 and T.Port.55 The Atlanta case was heard at the 
CFI, from where an appeal was made to the ECJ, where the issue of the 
relationship between the EC and the WTO was argued. The ECJ, in its 
judgment, confined itself to procedural issues and did not address directly 
the substantive issue of the relationship between the EC and the WTO as 
                                                                                                                                            
Trieste, Ente autonomo del porto di Trieste. Preliminary Ruling of 16 March 1983 requested by the 
Italian Corte di Cassazione, and Joined Cases 267-269/81, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato 
v. S.P.I. (Società Petrolifera Italiana ) s.p.a.(267/81) and Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. 
S.A.M.I (S.p.a. Michelin Italiana ) (268-269/81). Preliminary ruling of 16 March 1983 requested by the 
Italian Corte di Cassazione, CML Rev 20: 559-580, page 559. 
49
 International Fruit Company N.V. and others v. Producktschap Voor Groenten en fruit (No 3) Case 
21 - 24 /72). 
50
 Op. Cit. footnote no. 48. 
51
 Ibid.  
52
 Case C-104/97P. Atlanta AG v. European Community, [2001] 1 CMLR 20 
53
 Case T-18/99, Cordis Obst und Gemuse Großhandel GmbH v Commission of the European 
Communities, ECR 2001 page II-00913 
54
 Case T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, 
ECR 2001 page II-00943 
55
 Case T-52/99, T. Port GmbH & Co. KG v Commission of the European Communities, ECR 2001 
page II-00981 
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the plea on this matter was not included in the original appeal 
documentation and was, therefore, deemed inadmissible. The Advocate 
General did address the issue in his opinion. The ‘March 2001’ 
judgements were all heard at the CFI level. Only T.Port was appealed to 
the ECJ,56 but on appeal the ECJ only addressed the issue of the CFI’s 
calculation of reference quantities.  
 
In the Atlanta case at the ECJ, protection of legitimate expectations 
was pleaded. While the Advocate General recognised that this was ‘one 
of the fundamental principles of the Community, as the Community 
retained a discretion as to its running of its common markets’, traders had 
no legitimate expectation that an existing situation would be maintained 
when the Community institutions could alter it in the exercise of their 
discretionary powers.57 Further, the claim for non-contractual liability of 
the Community under Article 215 required ‘proof of illegal conduct, 
damage and a causal link’,58 and, in AG Mischo’s view, the claimants fell 
at the first hurdle, proof of illegal conduct. The claim in this case was 
that, in light of the findings at the WTO in EC-Bananas59 on the issue of 
the EC banana regime, the EC provisions were now illegal, not that the 
EC provisions dealing with the common organisation of bananas was in 
breach of the ‘substantive GATT provisions or those of the WTO’. The 
claimant therefore claimed that the ‘legislative provisions having been 
applied to the appellant in disregard of the binding effect on the 
Community of the decision of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’.60  
 
The AG stated that this plea was inadmissible as it had not been 
entered in the original appeal documentation from the CFI. However, 
utilising the common law technique of an obiter dicta, the AG stated that 
in any event, following the case of Commission v. Germany,61 the 
appellant could ‘not profitably set up the incompatibility of Regulation 
404/93 with the WTO Agreement to contest the reasoning of the Court of 
First Instance.’62 Going even further down the obiter dicta line, even the 
claim that EC law was in conflict with a decision of the Dispute 
Settlement Body ‘would not assist the appellant’s case’,63 on the basis 
that even a ruling of the Appellate Body of the DSU does not ‘impose on 
the party whose legislation is found to be contrary to the WTO provisions 
                                                 
56
 Ibid.  
57
 Ibid. at H8 of the report. 
58
 Ibid at H9 of the report. 
59
 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of 
the Appellate Body. WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997. 
60
 At point A19 of the AG’s opinion. 
61
 Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I- 4973 
62
 Ibid at A23 of the report.  
63
 Ibid at A24 of the report. 
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a duty immediately to amend that legislation’.64 The AG went on to say 
that ‘Clearly… the rights which a decision of the Appellate Body would 
intend to confer on individuals have nowhere near the scope which the 
appellant seeks to give them.65 This is particularly in light of the fact that, 
as pointed out by Zonnekeyn, ‘Article 22 of the DSU gives WTO 
members the possibility of maintaining the unlawful measures in place 
beyond the reasonable period of time if the parties to the dispute have 
agreed on a suitable compensation.66 
 
In the Cordis case,67 which was heard by the CFI, it was reiterated 
that ‘the WTO Agreement and its annexes are not intended to confer 
rights on individuals which they could rely on in court’,68 nor could the 
Community incur ‘non-contractual liability as a result of infringement of 
them’.69 The position in Portugal v. Council70 whereby, despite the 
significant differences between GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement, 
they both ‘nevertheless accord considerable importance to negotiation 
between the parties’71 was reaffirmed. The issue of the possibility of an 
imbalance of obligations between member states of the WTO, should the 
ECJ take any other line, was also addressed. The CFI also reaffirmed the 
ECJ’s line in Portugal v. Council that the Community judicature could 
not ‘deprive the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the 
scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by’ the Community’s trading partners 
within the WTO.72  
 
The argument was made in this case that there should be developed 
a ‘new category of misuse of powers’ to the extent that the Commission 
adopted a regulation in breach of WTO obligations. This was rejected 
outright. It is established case law of the ECJ that misuse of powers can 
only be claimed if legislation is ‘adopted with the exclusive or main 
purpose of achieving an end other than that stated’,73 but such an 
allegation was not being made, or could not be made, by the applicants in 
the Cordis case. The claim that a new category of misuse of powers 
existed should therefore be rejected. The CFI reaffirmed that, following 
Portugal v. Council, that ‘it is only where the Community intends to 
implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or 
                                                 
64
 Ibid at A27 of the report. 
65
 Ibid at A30 of the report. 
66
 Op. Cit. footnote no. 17. 
67
 Op. Cit. footnote no. 53. 
68
 Ibid at point 45.  
69
 Ibid. at paragraph 50.  
70
 Op. cit. footnote no. 5. 
71
 Ibid at paragraph 47.  
72
 Ibid at paragraph 49.  
73
 Ibid at paragraph 53. 
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where the Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions 
of the agreements contained in the annexes to the WTO Agreement, that 
it is for the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance to review the 
legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO 
rules.’74 As neither the WTO panel report (22nd May 1997)75 nor the 
Appellate Body report (9th September 1997)76 ‘included any special 
obligations which the Commission intended to implement, within the 
meaning of the case-law,77 in Regulation No. 2362/98,78 therefore such a 
claim could not be made here.  
 
In Bocchi Foods,79 the arguments and the findings of the CFI 
followed closely those of the Cordis case. The T.Port80 CFI case followed 
closely both the arguments and findings of Bocchi Foods and Cordis with 
the CFI stating that ‘it should be noted that it is clear from Community 
case-law that the WTO Agreement and its annexes are not intended to 
confer rights on individuals which they could rely on in court’.81 The CFI 
restated the position in Portugal v. Council by saying that ‘it is only 
where the Community intends to implement a particular obligation 
assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure 
refers expressly to the precise provisions of the agreements contained in 
the annexes to the WTO Agreement, that it is for the Court of Justice and 
the Court of First Instance to review the legality of the Community 
measure in question in the light of the WTO rules’.82 
 
With reference to the March 2001 judgements, Peers is of the 
view83 that the CFI was in error in concluding that the ‘implementation 
exceptions’ could be ‘deduced from previous case law’.  Peers argues 
that, while previous case law certainly did clarify the position with regard 
to the 1993 Regulation dealing with bananas, ‘it had not ruled on the 
applicability of those exceptions to subsequent amendments of the 
Regulation’. He advocates that it is ‘strongly arguable’ that the purpose of 
the 1998 Council Regulation was ‘related to a WTO obligation’.84 Peers 
goes on to point out that the 1998 regulation ‘expressly states in its 
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preamble that “the Community’s international commitments under the 
World Trade Organisation” should be met’. He further points out that the 
‘the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for a Council 
Regulation stated that the Council should “amend Regulation (EEC) No. 
404/93 to bring it into line with our international commitments within the 
framework of the WTO’ and that a ‘system of import licences compatible 
with the WTO should be introduced’.85 In light of this persuasive 
argument, it is hard to ignore Peers’ view that it is difficult to distinguish 
between a measure ‘being adopted “in order to comply” with the WTO 
ruling’, as the 1998 regulation clearly is, and a measure ‘intending to 
implement a WTO obligation’.86 
 
6. The Biret Case in the ECJ 
 
All of these cases brings us to the Biret case,87 and the opinion of 
Advocate General Alber, which merits examination. The claimant in this 
case, Biret requested that the CFI should develop ‘its case-law in the 
direction of a system of no-fault liability for the Community in respect of 
its normative acts’. This claim was rejected on the basis that this plea was 
introduced late in the proceedings and should have formed part of the 
original pleadings in this case. Problems also arose with the pleadings on 
appeal, so that the effect of the DSB ruling was not properly ruled on by 
the ECJ. The ECJ did however state that it had to take into consideration 
the period of time given by the WTO to the EC to amend its laws, and 
any examination of liability of EC institutions for the non-amendment of 
laws within that time period would ‘render ineffective the grant of a 
reasonable period for compliance’ with the DSB ruling.88  The ECJ 
therefore found that no damage could be proven to have occurred after 
the ‘reasonable period for compliance’, so it did not have to rule further 
on the matter. It also avoided ruling on the second plea, ‘concerning the 
Community’s alleged no fault liability’ as it had been submitted too late 
to be considered. 
 
The opinion of AG Alber in the ECJ case does however cast a 
different light on the issues raised in Biret. At point 83 of his opinion, he 
states that a ruling of the DSB removes the margin of manoeuvre of WTO 
contracting parties, with the obligation being to implement the findings of 
the DSB immediately and without condition. This, therefore, alters the 
nature of the obligation of the WTO member states, as there is, after a 
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DSB ruling, an ‘obligation sufficiently clear and precise’. He did 
recognise, however, that there was a need for a community legislative 
measure to put in place the provisions of the legislative changes in this 
situation.89  He went on to say that, from the point of view of Community 
law, the right of the free exercise of economic activities would be in 
favour of the recognition of direct effect of the rulings of the DSB, after 
the expiration of a reasonable delay for amending EC law.90 In such a 
situation, Albert is also of the opinion that there would be a case for 
recognising the possibility of bringing a case for compensation for EC 
non-compliance with WTO law.91  
 
This opinion of the Advocate General, should it be adopted in a 
future ECJ ruling, would provide a third exception to be added to the 
Fedoil92 and Nakajima93 exceptions to the rule that WTO law does not 
have direct effect within EC law. These two exceptions, as confirmed in 
the Atlanta case,94 are the only ones that currently hold, with a continuing 
large area of interface between EC and WTO law being subject to a 
‘boundary clash’. The question therefore arises that if a case comes 
before the ECJ, a “post-Biret” case where damage can be proven to have 
occurred after a “reasonable period for compliance has passed” and a plea 
is entered timeously for the Community to develop “a system of no fault 
liability in respect of its normative acts” will the ECJ distinguish the Biret 
ruling, and adopt the reasoning of AG Alber in that case. Will the judges 
of the ECJ, on the other hand, more conscious of the political position of 
the ECJ within the EC/EU legal framework, give further meat to 
Ehlermann and Rosas’s95 argument against unduly tying the “hands of the 
Community negotiations” recognising the severe democratic deficit at the 
WTO. The draft EU Constitution merits some examination to see if it 
sheds any light on this matter. 
 
7. The Constitutional aspect of the relationship with member state 
legislation  
 
 
The EU is currently drafting a “Constitution for Europe”. This 
document is intended to address many of the recurrent constitutional 
problems of the EC/EU. Article III-315 of the draft Constitution, (after 
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signature), reflecting a rebalancing of power between the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission, and the adoption of European laws and 
Framework laws as the new secondary legislative tools under the 
Constitution, closely matches the provisions of the current Article 133 
EC. The CCP is, however, extended by the draft Constitution to cover not 
just ‘trade in goods’ and the post Nice Article 133 provisions on trade in 
services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, but also to 
foreign direct investment. The unanimity requirements for voting in the 
Council of Ministers in the field of services and intellectual property is 
preserved and is also extended to cover the ‘negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services’,96 
with specific provisions being also made for the conclusion of transport 
agreements.97 It would appear, from the current draft of the Constitution, 
that no such unanimity will be required for international agreements on 
foreign direct investment. What is new, however, is the statement at the 
end of Article III-315 that the CCP ‘shall be conducted in the context of 
the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action’, possibly 
bringing the CCP under the influence of the more robust provisions being 
introduced for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by 
the draft Constitution. 
 
7.1 The Issue of Exclusive Competence 
 
Factors which might influence the ECJ in a post Biret judgment 
would be the issue of exclusive competence and subsidiarity in the post 
“draft Constitution”. As stated by Lord Slynn of Hadley,98 the currently 
numbered Article 133 EC99 ‘has raised in particular difficult questions’ as 
to the competence of the EC and, through it, the competence of the EC 
Commission together with the issue of the relationship between the EC 
and its member states. This is complicated by the fact that the ECJ, in 
Opinion 1/78,100 found that the CCP had a dynamic and evolutionary 
character’, and that the EC must have ‘the possibility .. to take account of 
new needs and new developments’.101 This approach is reflected in 
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Opinion 2/91,102 when the ECJ stated, developing from the ERTA 
judgment,103 that the ‘principle of exclusivity’ cannot be limited to areas 
where the EC has ‘adopted rules within the framework of a common 
policy, but is applicable in all areas corresponding to the objectives of the 
Treaty’.104  
 
In Opinion 1/94, the ECJ provided that the now numbered Articles 
95 EC105 and Article 308 EC106 could not ‘in themselves confer exclusive 
competence on the Community’.107 The draft Constitution addresses the 
issue of exclusive and shared competence in its Articles 12 and 13, 
referred to above, with the newly expanded CCP being an area of 
exclusive competence, and shared competence, under Article 13 being 
‘where the Constitution confers (on the Union) a competence which does 
not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 12 (inter alia, the CCP), and 
16’. Article 16 provides for ‘supporting, coordinating or complementary 
action’, and contains both industry and public health issues, which might 
be relevant to the CCP. Shared competence is attributed, inter alia, to the 
internal market, agricultural and fisheries, (excluding the conservation of 
marine biological resources), social policy, the environment, consumer 
protection and public health issues.  
 
As is pointed out by Craig, rather than conducting a ‘root and 
branch re-consideration’ of the issue of competence and subsidiarity, the 
draft Convention adopted the approach of the maintenance of the status 
quo, but where a shift was made on competence, it had a ‘general 
tendency …to reinforce EU power, not to “repatriate” it to the Member 
States.’ 108 It could perhaps be said that the issue of exclusive and non-
exclusive competence may not be finally resolved by the draft 
Constitution, should it come into force. An outstanding problem, relevant 
to this paper, will be the tension between the Customs Union policy, an 
area of exclusive competence and ‘other aspects of the internal market’ 
which is usually shared competence.109 In addition, the EU’s exclusive 
external competence, under the post signature Article I-13(2) when the 
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internal competence is not exclusively the EU’s, retains ‘difficulties in 
terms of clarity’.110 In order to resolve this issue, both to date, and in this 
writer’s opinion in the future, in the absence of clarity from the EC Treaty 
or the proposed Constitution, this matter has to be analysed through the 
use of principles developed by the ECJ, which in themselves are not 
clear.  
 
What is clear, in the matter of GATT/WTO Agreements, is that the 
Member States of the EC have ‘retained competence over budgetary 
matters’111 relating to WTO membership. In addition, Emilou, quotes 
Timmermans112 as arguing that, under the current legal framework, even 
in the area of CAP common organisations, EC member states, even in this 
highly occupied field, ‘retained a parallel power to adopt national 
measures provided that they did not jeopardise the objectives and 
functioning of the common markets’;113 however, EC member states 
would be precluded from entering into international agreements in such 
policy areas. Emilou also points out, relying on Kapteyn,114 that in areas 
where there are no such common policies, EC member states were not so 
restricted.115 In World Trade matters there is, however, such a common 
policy, the Common Commercial Policy.116 This would continue to be the 
case in a post-Constitution EU, as under the draft constitution there is 
‘little containment of EU power” in “the domain of exclusive external 
competence’117 under the now numbered Art.I-13(2).118 
 
Addressing the current situation, Kuijper throws a spanner in the 
works by pointing out that the ECJ, in Opinion 1/94, does not use the 
term ‘mixed competence’ (competence mixed), but ‘joint competence’ 
(competence partagée).119 He goes on to say that the drawing of sharp 
distinctions between EC and member state competence may not be 
‘helpful’ in addressing issues ‘involving the management of the WTO 
Agreement’ and in issues of ‘cross retaliation’, adding that the duty to co-
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operate between the EC and its member states on this point is more 
important.120 This argument could still be made with regard to a post–
Constitution situation, even if it is found that the line between exclusive 
and shared competence has been shifted somewhat under the proposed 
treaty. Should the issue of WTO obligations by the EC and its member 
states be relegated to the area of joint or shared competence under EC 
jurisprudence, then we enter another very difficult area of EC law, that of 
subsidiarity. 121 
 
7.2 The Issue of Subsidiarity 
 
 
Cottier sees the relegating of the issue of WTO competence within 
the EC to an issue of subsidiarity between the EC and its member states 
as strength from the point of view of the ‘internal power relations’ within 
the EC.122 He does, however, admit that from an external perspective, this 
approach ‘hardly reinforces the position of Europe in relations with other 
Members of the WTO, in particular the United States’.123 Cottier also 
highlights the issue of differentiating ‘law-making’ and ‘law-applying’ 
case law, and he advocates the politically pragmatic, though legally less 
satisfying, approach of ‘team-work’ between the Commission and the 
national administrations concerned in WTO disputes.124  
 
The draft European Convention deals with the issue of subsidiarity 
in the post signature Article I-11 with a protocol attached to the draft 
Constitution.125 Article I-11 refers to the principle of conferral being the 
governing principle of the limits of the Union’s competences with ‘the 
use of the Union’s competences’ to be ‘governed by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality’. While both subsidiarity and 
proportionality are familiar concepts, the conferral principle, despite the 
new name, also appears to offer little that is new to the analysis of the law 
in this area. Much of Article I-11 looks familiar, although the reference to 
whether an action can be sufficiently achieved by a Member State, in 
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paragraph 3 of this article, refers to ‘either at central level or at regional 
and local level’, adds a new layer of governance for the post-Constitution 
EU principle of subsidiarity. The protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality builds on the principles 
provided for in earlier EC/EU documentation,126 providing for procedural 
mechanisms for the operation of the principle. As stated by Craig, 
however, ‘it remains to be seen how subsidiarity and the Protocol operate 
in practice’.127 
 
7.3 The Political Dimension 
 
 
From a first reading, therefore, of the draft Constitution it would 
appear that clarity cannot be brought to the EC-WTO legal nexus to be 
adjudicated on a post-Biret case. The political aspect of a post-Biret 
judgment is therefore thrown into sharp relief. It is clear to Cottier that 
‘non-compliance [with WTO law] may even threaten the consistency of 
the Union’s legal order’,128 and with it the concept of the supremacy of 
Community law. This would put in jeopardy the ‘imperfect constitutional 
structure’ of the EC referred to in the introduction to this article and as 
recognised in the draft European Constitution. Cottier points out that the 
supremacy of EC law depends on ‘legitimacy and persuasion’, with legal 
provisions which are ‘inconsistent with international obligations’ putting 
this in jeopardy.129 Legitimacy of persuasion could also be jeopardised in 
light of Rosa’s view, referred to earlier, that the lack of democratic 
accountability of WTO bodies and the need to ‘strike a balance between 
trade and societal values’ has also to be added to the political mix.130 This 
then has to be juxtaposed against Zonnekeyn’s point that failure to grant 
WTO law direct effect within the EC legal jurisdiction in order to grant 
the EC negotiators at the WTO room for manoeuvre in future 
negotiations is an assault on the trias political principle and is based on 
political reasoning by the ECJ, rather than legal reasoning. Kuijper’s 
argument on the duty to co-operate between the EC and its member 
states,131 discussed earlier in the context of exclusive competence, 
continues on this theme. Cottier, advocating team work between the EC 
and its member states with regard to WTO commitments, reflects this 
politically pragmatic, rather than strictly legal, allocation of obligations. 
In addition, non-compliance by the EC or part of the EC with WTO 
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commitments would lose credibility of other WTO member states in the 
EC, and would lose the EC international market access rights.132 This 
academic analysis is reflected in the ECJ’s reasoning in Portugal v. 
Council and in the AG’s opinion in Biret, with regard to WTO obligation 
which had not been adjudicated upon by the DSB.  
 
8. Conclusion. 
 
 
The above points highlight some problematic issues from a legal 
perspective, which resolve themselves to relative clarity when examined 
from a political perspective. The response of the ECJ following what 
appears to be political reasoning rather than pure legal reasoning, as to 
the legal effect of WTO law within the EC jurisdiction.  It gives rise to a 
question as to the exact balance of powers between the EC and its 
member states in the context of the EC’s relationship with the WTO and, 
in this context, the relative role of the EC institutions within the EC 
jurisdiction and the role that the ECJ has developed for itself within the 
EC. While the EC is clearly set up to run on the basis of the rule of law, 
the issue does arises whether the ECJ should ignore the ‘unanimous 
position of the Governments’ of the EC vis a vis the World Trade 
Organisation.133 As stated in one Common Market Law Review editorial, 
the balance is between the ECJ acceding to governments’ demands 
pursuant to pressure ‘from weak industries defending their own short 
term interests’ or should the ECJ protect the interests of EC consumers 
and the EC’s own interests by ‘granting direct effect of’ what was then 
GATT 47 obligations ‘against the wishes of the Governments’.134 As 
pointed out in the same editorial, ‘the Court cannot govern Europe’,135 
despite the highly political role that it has been asked to play in the 
context of the legal relationship between the EC jurisdiction and the 
WTO jurisdiction. The ECJ, may, however, be faced with this role, in the 
absence of clearer direction from the treaties, in our “post- Biret” case. 
 
Some writers would argue that the ECJ has not been shy of 
developing law when it felt the need to do so, as in the development of 
the Treaty of Rome itself, converting a traditional multilateral treaty136 
into a constitutional charter governed by a form of constitutional law.137 
However, as Mancini pointed out, the ECJ ‘would have been far less 
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successful had it not been assisted by two mighty allies: the national 
courts and the Commission’.138 On the issue of GATT and WTO, when 
the issue comes before the ECJ, ‘even the Commission [pleaded] against 
applying the international rules within the Community legal order’.139  
 
Perhaps a more effective analysis can be made of the situation 
when, unlike with many other international legal obligations entered into 
by the EC, the WTO and before it GATT 47 do have within them very 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms. The issue of the EC and the 
ECJ’s relationship with other international tribunals has caused problems 
for the ECJ in other instances. This issue is brought to the fore by Usher, 
who points out that this issue of possible overlapping jurisdictions with 
international tribunals ‘has arisen in a number of requests under Article 
300 for an Opinion’.140 He goes on to point out that in Opinion 1/91, 
which dealt with the creation of an EEA Court, the ECJ, in defence of its 
own prerogatives, held that ‘to confer “jurisdiction” on the EEA Court 
was incompatible with Community law’.141 This is in line with the 
observation that the ECJ has shown itself to be hostile ‘to the creation of, 
or accession to, other international tribunals with overlapping jurisdiction 
or membership’.142 While the ECJ has exercised an ability to be both 
restrictive and developmental in its interpretation of the EC treaty, it is 
most activist in its efforts to ensure the uniform control of the validity of 
Community acts and the exercising of judicial control over the activities 
of the EC bodies in the context of the legal process.143  It is perhaps 
somewhat naive to expect the ECJ to exercise its activist abilities at its 
own expense, in the defence of law of another organisation, merely for 
the sake of the discipline itself.  
 
The WTO legal jurisdiction will develop with time, both as a 
consequence of further panel and appellate body reports at the WTO, and 
further rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. The competing pulls of 
EC law and WTO law, with its interdependent and reflexive relationship, 
with the development of ‘new and endemic boundary clashes’ between 
these two polities leading to, as suggested by Walker, a transformation of 
mutual self understanding.144 This contentious evolution is in line with 
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constitutional lawyers’ pluralistic thinking which emphasise ‘the 
possibility of constitutional collision between high judicial authorities of 
different polities as the major point of contestation and crucial axis of 
rational authority’.145 In the meantime the EC Commercial lawyer, 
working with the “dynamic and evolutionary character of the CCP” 146 is 
left with an imperfect, but perhaps evolving, situation in the absence of 
the direct effect of WTO law within the EC. These issues will 
increasingly require attention in the forthcoming years, in the absence of 
amendments to the draft Constitution for Europe prior to enactment, then 
by way of further developments of ECJ jurisprudence. 
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